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The Influence of U.S. Jurisprudence on the 
Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms: An Initial Survey 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982 the Canadian government enacted several important amendments to 
its constitution. I These amendments include the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which established constitutional protection for the civil rights of 
Canadian citizens.2 In addition, the Charter established the concept of judicial 
review giving the Canadian courts the authority to strike down any legislation 
inconsistent with provisions in the Charter.3 
Although the Charter states which rights and freedoms are to receive consti-
tutional protection,4 the courts will ultimately have to determine the degree of 
I The Constitution Act, 1982 is the document which contains most of these amendments. Consti-
tution Act, 1982. The Act has sixty sections and is divided into seven parts. The parts are entitled: (I) 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; (2) Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada; (3) 
Equalization and Regional Disparities; (4) Constitutional Conference; (5) Procedure for Amending 
Constitution of Canada; (6) Amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867; and (7) General. /d. 
The Constitution Act, 1982, is Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982. The Canada Act 1982, containing 
only four sections, is the instrument which officially amended the Canadian Constitution. Canada Act 
1982, 1982 c. II(U.K.). Section one of the Canada Act established the Constitution Act, 1982 and 
enacted it into law. Section two terminated the British Parliament's power to enact laws for Canada. 
See infra notes 16-21,83-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of Britain's relationship to Canada. 
Section three established the French version of the Act and made it clear that it had the same authority 
as the English version. Section four states that the Act may be cited as the Canada Act of 1982. 
Both the Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Act, 1982 became part of the Canadian Constitution 
on March 29, 1982. The Constitution Act, 1982, however, according to section 58, was not to come 
into force until "a day to be fixed by proclamation." Constitution Act, 1982 § 58. This proclamation 
occurred on April 17, 1982, at which time the Constitution Act, 1982 became effective. 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [hereinafter cited as Charter]. The Charter is Part I 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
3 Days, Civil Rights in Canada; An American Perspective, 32 AM. J. COMPo L. 307, 328 (1984); THE 
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS: LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED 50 (W. MacKay ed. 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED]. 
4 The rights protected by the Charter include: fundamental freedoms; democratic rights; mobility 
rights; legal rights; equality rights; and minority language educational rights. See Charter §§ 1-23. For 
a discussion of these newly enacted rights see P. HOGG, CANADA ACT 1982 ANNOTATED (1982) [here-
inafter cited as P. HOGG ANNOTATED]; Hogg, Canada's New Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. COMPo L. 283 
(1984) [hereinafter cited as New Charter]; W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, THE CANADIAN CHARTER 
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (1982). 
73 
74 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No. I 
protection given to these rights. s This is especially true since section one of the 
Charter, entitled "Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms," states: 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.6 
Case law dealing with the Charter's rights and freedoms, however, has only 
started to ftourish. 7 Canadian courts will undoubtedly continue to hand down 
important decisions interpreting the Charter. Therefore, it will take some time 
to determine the extent to which the Charter protects the individual. 
Substantively, the Canadian Charter is similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights. 8 
Although there is presently very little case law involving the Canadian Charter, 
U.S. courts have subjected the amendments in the U.S. Bill of Rights to a 
tremendous amount of judicial interpretation." Because U.S. courts already have 
a great deal of experience interpreting constitutionally protected rights and 
freedoms, Canadian courts are likely to look to U.S. jurisprudence to help 
interpret the Canadian Charter. 'O 
One commentator has proposed four additional reasons Canadian courts 
might rely on U.S. jurisprudence to help interpret various provlSlons of the 
Charter. I I First, the adoption of language similar to that used in the U.S. Bill 
of Rights indicates that the Canadian Parliament intended courts to rely on U.S. 
decisions to help interpret the Charter. 12 Second, the reference in section one 
5 At a conference addressing Canada's new constitution, one speaker stated: "Canada's judiciary, 
and in particular .the Supreme Court of Canada, will either breathe life into the Charter, or reduce it 
to a hollow promise of things that might have been." LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 
50. 
b Charter § I. 
7 An official reporter entitled Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been established to 
exclusively report Charter decisions. Other sources which deal exclusively with Charter decisions 
include: R. McLEOD,]. TAKACH, H. MORTON, & M. SEGAL, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as R. McLEOD]; THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED (CLB) (1984). 
8 See inJra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. 
9 The D. S. Constitution was enacted in 1789. The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments adopted 
for the protection of individual rights, was enacted in 1791. The U.S. court system, therefore, has had 
close to two hundred years to interpret its constitution and Bill of Rights. 
10 Beckton, Freedom oj Expression-Access to the Courts, 61 CAN. B. REV. 101 (1983). C. Beckton, 
Professor of Law at Dalhousie University stated: 
Our courts can benefit from the wisdom and mistakes of the American courts that has 
developed through periods of trial and error. This is not to say they should slavishly follow 
the tests created by the Supreme Court but merely that they examine some tests which offer, 
or fail to offer adequate protection to freedom of expression. By examining the successes 
and failures these undesirable tests can be avoided in Canada. 
!d. at 108. 
II R. McLEOD, supra note 7, at 2-103. 
12 !d. 
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of the Charter to place "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstr-
ably justified in a free and democratic society" suggests that Canadian courts 
should look to those limits enforced in the United States. 13 Third, the fact that 
the rights expressed in the Charter have now become entrenched in the Ca-
nadian Constitution makes it easier than in the past for Canadian courts to rely 
on U.S. decisions. 14 Fourth, the similarities in societal aspirations and expecta-
tions of Canadian and U.S. citizens will naturally lead Canadian courts to rely 
on U.S. decisions to help interpret constitutional issues. 15 
This Comment examines the influence of U.S. judicial decisions on the inter-
pretation of the newly enacted Canadian Charter. The author first focuses on 
the structure of Canada's Constitution prior to the enactment of the Charter. 
The author then discusses Canada's unsuccessful attempt to protect civil rights 
through the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights. The author also discusses 
the structure of the Charter and the reasons for its enactment. The author then 
compares the Charter with the U.S. Bill of Rights. Finally, the author analyzes 
Canadian court decisions under three sections of the Charter, which use lan-
guage similar to provisions in the U.S. Bill of Rights. The author demonstrates 
that Canadian courts have adopted several U.S. tests and standards to help 
determine whether governmental action has unconstitutionally restricted rights 
protected by the Charter. The author concludes that, to determine how the 
Canadian courts will interpret other Charter issues, an analysis of the U.S. court 
system's approach to those same issues will be helpful. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The British North America Act of 1867 
Prior to 1982,16 Canada's constitutional document was entitled The British 
North America Act of 1867.J7 The British Parliament enacted the BNA in order 




16 The Canada Act was enacted in 1982. 
17 The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic., ch. 3. [hereinafter cited as BNA]. The 
enactment of the 1982 amendment to the Canadian Constitution, however, did not invalidate the 
entire BNA. The amended Canadian Constitution has incorporated many sections of the BNA. See 
Constitution Act, 1982 § 53. 
18 See M. LALONDE & R. BASFORD, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
9 (1979). The BNA, however, was not Great Britain's first attempt at developing a governmental 
structure for the colony of Canada. Britain enacted three other constitutions for Canada before the 
BNA. The other three constitutions were the Quebec Act of 1774, the Constitutional Act of 1791 and 
the Union Act of 1840. !d. 
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gave Canada the authority to make laws for, and control, its own government. 19 
Although the Canadian government viewed the BNA as the constitution of 
Canada, it was actually a British statute. 20 Therefore, British Parliament had 
exclusive authority to alter or replace the document at any time. 21 
The B N A established the concept of federalism in Canada. 22 It set up a central 
federal government, the Canadian Parliament,23 and a government for each 
province.24 The BNA also distributed legislative powers between Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures. Sections 91 and 92 of the B N A listed the distribution 
of these powers. 25 Section 91 contained the powers delegated to Parliament 
while section 92 contained the powers delegated to the provinces.26 
Section 91 listed twenty-nine specific subjects over which the Canadian Par-
liament had exclusive authority. For example, Parliament was empowered to 
regulate trade and commerce,27 defense,2s currency,29 the postal service,30 nav-
igation and shipping,31 weights and measures,32 and taxation. 33 The power of 
the federal government, however, was not limited to these twenty-nine areas. 
Section 91 also gave Parliament the general power to: 
make laws for the Peace, Order and good Government of Canada, 
in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects 
by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces 
34 
19 See G. FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 3-4 (1965). Even after 
enactment of the BNA, Britain retained power to enact laws for the colony of Canada. However, by 
1931 Britain no longer retained this legislative authority. After 1931 the only circumstances under 
which Britain would enact legislation affecting Canada was when Canada specifically requested such 
action. This was in accordance with The Statute of Westminster, 1931, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 
26, which states in part that no act of British Parliament extends to a Dominion "as part of the law of 
that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in the Act that the Dominion has requested, and 
consented to, the enactment thereof." I d. 
20 M. LALONDE & R. BASFORD, supra note 18, at 9. 
21 !d. 
22 !d. B. LAWSON, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 11-16 (1960). 
23 BNA § 17. 
24 BNA §§ 58-88; G. FAVREAU, supra note 19, at 4. 
25 BNA §§ 91,92; G. FAVREAU, supra note 19, at 4. 
26 For an analysis of the BNA, see B. LAWSON, supra note 22, at 11-28; W. LEDERMAN, THE COURTS 
AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1964). 
27 BNA § 91(2). 
28 BNA § 91(7). 
29 BNA § 91(14). 
30 BNA § 91(5). 
31 BNA § 91(10). 
32 BNA § 91(17). 
33 BNA § 91(3). 
34 BNA § 91. 
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Parliament could, therefore, regulate any matter which fell within its more 
general power. 35 
The BNA did not give the provinces as broad power as the Canadian Parlia-
ment. Nevertheless, section 92 of the BNA assigned sixteen specific powers to 
the provincial legislatures.36 The provinces had the power to organize their 
court systems,37 tax citizens for provincial purposes,38 and manage the sale of 
public lands and timber belonging to the province.39 They also had control of 
municipal institutions,40 property laws,41 and civil rights in the province.42 Ad-
ditionally, section 93 of the BNA empowered the provinces to regulate educa-
tional matters. 43 
Although the powers distributed to the provincial legislatures were different 
from those granted to Parliament, both governments enjoyed equal status.44 
The provincial and parliamentary powers within their respective areas were 
complete, and each government functioned without serious interference from 
the other. 45 
The BNA also provided for the manner in which governmental power was 
to be exercised.46 The BNA made it clear that the exercise of federal power 
was to be carried out by the Governor General, the representative of the 
Queen.47 The Governor General, however, acted only on the advice of consti-
35 B. LAWSON. supra note 22. at 14-15. 
36 BNA § 92. 
37 BNA § 92(14). 
38 BNA § 92(2). 
39 BNA § 92(5). 
40 BNA § 92(8). 
41 BNA § 92(13). 
42 BNA § 92(13). 
43 Parliament. however, was given limited legislative authority to ensure the protection of minority 
rights for denominational. separate. or dissentient schools. The provinces were to legislate in all other 
educational areas. See BNA § 93. 
44 R. DAWSON. THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 78 (1970). 
45 !d. Some powers within the BNA. however. were concurrent. Parliament and the provinces both 
had the power to control agriculture and immigration. BNA § 95. In the case of a conflict. the federal 
legislation governed. B. LAWSON. supra note 22. at 15. 
46 BNA § 12. 
47 BNA § 12. Parliament was structured by the BNA to include the Queen. the Senate, and the 
House of Commons. BNA § 17. 
The Senate and the House of Commons are the two legislative bodies of the Canadian Parliament. 
The Senate plays a minor part in the legislative process. Its main functions and duties are to act as a 
revising and restraining body. and to protect the interests of the provinces and minority. racial, 
religious. and language groups. Members of the Senate are appointed for life by the Governor General. 
The House of Commons has substantially more authority in the legislative process. The House has 
three major functions. First. it acts as the Committee of Supply. dealing with votes and grants for 
expenditure. Second. it acts as the Committee of Ways and Means. dealing with raising money. Third. 
it acts as the Committee of the Whole House. evaluating public and money bills. The House of 
Commons. whose members are elected. is the medium through which the public can express its 
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tutional advisors, namely the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.48 Powers granted 
to the provinces were to be exercised by Lieutenant Governors acting on the 
advice of provincial ministers and cabinet members.49 
The BNA, which was responsible for introducing the concept of federalism 
into Canada's governmental structure, also introduced the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy.50 This concept of parliamentary supremacy was similar, 
but not identical, to that used in Great Britain's government. The major differ-
ence was that unlike the government in Great Britain, Canadian governments 
had limited powers.51 Although the Canadian Parliament had absolute legislative 
authority, it existed only in those areas specified by section 91 of the BN A. 
Similarly, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, as it applied to the provin-
cial governments, extended only to those powers listed in section 92 of the 
BNAY Moreover, within this structure the Canadian courts assumed the power 
to review governmental legislation.53 Courts could declare legislation invalid if 
they considered the enactment of such legislation to be outside the powers of 
the enacting body.54 The Canadian system was, therefore, structured in a way 
opinions and exercise its political power. For a general discussion on the structure of the Canadian 
government, see B. LAWSON, supra note 22. 
48 The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are elected into office and control the administration of the 
government. B. LAWSON, supra note 22, at 20. 
Although the BNA required the Queen to exercise the federal power, by the 1920s, Canada exercised 
its federal powers without involving either the Queen or the Governor General. See LAW PRACTICE 
REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 10. 
49 Each provincial government, therefore, established a Lieutenant Governor as part of its structure 
in order to exercise its power. Apart from this common feature, however, provincial governments 
could be structured differently. For instance, Quebec has a Lieutenant Governor and two Houses, the 
Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. Ontario on the other hand, is structured to include 
a Lieutenant Governor and only one House, the Legislative Assembly. G. FAVREAU, supra note 19. at 
4. 
50 A leading Canadian constitutional scholar explained parliamentary supremacy in the following 
manner: 
In the United Kingdom there are no limits to legislative power: there is no fundamental law 
which cannot be altered by ordinary parliamentary action; there is no instrument constituent 
which allocates some subject matters of legislation to the Parliament and denies others to it; 
and there is no bill of rights which denies to the Parliament the power to destroy or curtail 
civil liberties. Any law. upon any subject matter. no matter how outrageous is within the 
Parliament's competence. It follows. of course, that the courts have no power to deny the 
force of law to any statute enacted by the Parliament. Judicial review of legislation is unheard 
of in the United Kingdom. 
P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 421-422 (1977), quoted in Days, supra note 3, at 309 n.7. 
For a general analysis of the concept of parliamentary supremacy, see A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 87-91 (1961). 
51 New Charter, supra note 4. at 284. 
52 See id. 
53 Sections 96-101 and 129 of the BNA concern the Canadian court system. For a discussion of the 
Canadian court system see infra note 91. See also W. LEDERMAN, supra note 26, at 177-219. 
54 In order to determine whether enacted legislation under the BNA was invalid. the courts used 
the concept of mutual exclusion. The premise was that there was no area in which Parliament and 
the provinces could both legislate. W. LEDERMAN, supra note 26, at 201. 
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which allowed the doctrines of parliamentary supremacy and federalism to 
coexist. 55 This type of constitutional structure developed as the result of the 
influence of both Great Britain and the United States on the BNA.56 
Although the framers of the BNA adopted the U.S. concept of federalism, 
they failed to establish a counterpart to the U.S. Bill of Rights. As a result, the 
BNA did not protect civil liberties. Based on the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy, the Canadian Parliament could curtail any right or freedomY Par-
liament could enact any statute regardless of how severely it injured individual 
civil rights. 5H Therefore, the BNA limited individual rights to those freedoms 
not restricted by law. 59 Furthermore, once Parliament restricted a right, no 
process existed through which the individual could challenge the parliamentary 
action.60 
Since the Canadian Constitution was based partly on the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy and it did not contain provisions dealing with civil liberties, 
Canadian courts did not rely on U.S. cases to help protect individual rights.61 
Between the late 1930s and the late 1950s, however, Canadian courts applied a 
principle called the "implied bill of rights."62 Under this principle, the courts 
considered certain areas, such as freedom of speech and religion, to be outside 
the authority of both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. 63 These deci-
55 The provincial organization of Canada. in particular French speaking Quebec. pressured the 
framers of BNA to develop the concept of federalism. Days. supra note 3. at 309. 
56 B. LAWSON. supra note 22. at 17. 
57 New Charter, supra note 4, at 284-85. The case of Re Alberta Legislation, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, the 
seminal case establishing freedom of expression in Canada, did not immunize freedom of expression 
from parliamentary control. 
5R New Charter, supra note 4, at 284-85. 
59 Not all rights and freedoms were in fact restricted in Canada. New Charter, supra note 4, at 285. 
Canadians had the right to a free election and there was the existence of a free press. Id. 
6°Id. 
61 Although there was no direct reliance on U.S. cases during the period in which the BNA was 
Canada's constitutional document, similarities, nevertheless, existed between court decisions in the two 
systems. Several Canadian court decisions in the late 1950s contain reasoning similar to certain U.S. 
decisions of the early 1940s. The Canadian cases involved the concept of validity, that every official 
act must be justified by law. Based on this principle Canadian courts held that, without an applicable 
federal statute. governmental actions taken to suppress religious activities could not be permitted. See 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 16 D.L.R.2d 689 (1959); Lamb v. Benoit, 17 D.L.R.2d 369 (1959); Chaput v. 
Romain, I D.L.R.2d 241 (1955). This approach is similar to the one taken in U.S. cases of the 1940s 
declaring restrictions on religious activity unconstitutional. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 195 (1943). The Supreme Court in Cantwell, for instance, 
held that the applicable statute permitting restrictions on religious activity was invalid because it was 
too general. Therefore, since there was no constitutionally valid statute allowing regulation of the 
religious activity, such activity could not be restricted. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296-307. 
62 In the 1978 case of Attorney-General of Canada v. Dupond, 84 D.L.R.3d 420 (1978), the Supreme 
Court of Canada rejected the use of an implied bill of rights to protect individual rights of free speech 
and religion. 
63 See Switzman v. Elbing, 1957 S.C.R. 285 (the Act Respecting Communist Propaganda, R.S.Q. 
1941, ch. 52 held invalid because it was ultra vires of the provincial legislature); Re Alberta Legislation, 
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sions were based on the fact that the drafters of the BNA attempted to establish 
a governmental structure in which parliamentary supremacy and freedom of 
expression could coexist.64 For instance, the 1938 case of Re Alberta Legislation65 
addressing the issue of an individual's right to free speech observed: 
As stated in the preamble of the British North America Act, our 
constitution is ... "similar in principle to that of the United King-
dom." At the time of Confederation, the United Kingdom was a 
democracy. Democracy cannot be maintained without its founda-
tion: free public opinion and free discussion throughout the nation 
of all matters affecting the State .... 66 
Although the Canadian courts attempted to protect the right to free speech 
and religion, it was not until the 1960s that the Canadian Parliament enacted 
legislation to protect civil rights in Canada. 
B. The Canadian Bill of Rights 
In 1960 the federal government enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights. 67 Draf-
ters of this legislation intended the instrument to provide protection for indi-
vidual rights. 68 Due to the complicated and slow process of amending the BNA, 
however, the Canadian government decided to enact its Bill of Rights as a 
federal statute.69 This lower status meant that the legislature could amend or 
strike down the Bill of Rights at any time. 70 Furthermore, because it was a 
federal statute, it applied only to the Canadian Parliament, not the provinces. 7l 
The Bill of Rights contained two parts. Part one established all the rights to 
be protected by the statute. It gave individuals the right to enjoy freedom of 
speech, religion, press, assembly and association, equality before the law, and 
the right to life and liberty.72 It prohibited cruel and unusual punishment,73 
[1938] 2 D.L.R. 81 (the Act to Ensure the Publication of Accurate Laws and Information (Press Bill) 
held invalid because it was ultra vires of the provincial legislatures). See also Saumur v. City of Quebec 
& A.-G. Que., [1953]4 D.L.R. 641 for a discussion of provincial legislative authority to restrict freedom 
of speech and religion. 
6' Days, supra note 3, at 313. 
65 [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81. 
66 [d. at 119. 
67 Canadian Bill of Rights S.c. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III [hereinafter cited as Bill of 
Rights]. 
68 See Days, supra note 3, at 323. 
69 See notes 83-97 and accompanying text. For a discussion describing the difficulties associated with 
amending the BNA, see Scott, Dominion jurisdiction Over Human Rights and Fundomental Freedoms, 27 
CAN. BAR. REV. 497, 497-511 (1949). 
70 S. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 4. 
7J /d. at 22. 
72 Bill of Rights § l(aHf). 
7' Bill of Rights § 2(b). 
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arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of any person,74 and unfair hear-
ings.75 Furthermore, it entitled a person who had been arrested to the rights to 
be informed of the reason for the arrest, to retain counsel without delay, and 
to obtain a remedy by way of habeas corpus.76 
Since Canada's governmental structure included the concept of parliamentary 
supremacy, the Canadian court system was uncertain of the approach to take 
with respect to legislation that violated the Bill of Rights. 77 Courts were unsure 
if they were supposed to take an active role and strike down statutes in conflict 
with this new Canadian document.7s Furthermore, it was questionable what 
weight these rulings would actually have since Parliament was capable of en-
acting subsequent legislation which would override these court decisions. 79 With 
the exception of one case, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to use the 
Canadian Bill of Rights to protect individual freedom. so As a result, like the 
decisions prior to 1960, Canadian decisions after the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights did not refer to U.S. opinions, although both governments now had 
documents similarly designed to protect civil rights. 
III. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The Canadian Parliament, as early as 1960, attempted to protect civil rights 
in Canada by enacting the Canadian Bill of Rights. Parliament, however, enacted 
the Bill of Rights as a federal statute, which in practice was ineffective.s1 As 
noted earlier, Parliament chose to enact the Bill of Rights as a federal statute 
because of the slow and complicated process associated with amending the BNA. 
In 1982, the Canadian Parliament finally changed the amendment process and 
was able to enact the Canadian Charter which established constitutional protec-
tion for the civil rights of Canadian citizens.s2 
A. Enactment of the Charter 
Canada's independence from Great Britain came as the result of an evolu-
tionary development which was complete by the early 1930s. S3 Even after Can-
74 Bill of Rights § 2(a). 
75 Bill of Rights § 2(e). 
76 Bill of Rights § 2(c)(i),(ii),(iii). 
77 Days, supra note 3, at 324. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80 See Regina v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R.3d 473 (1970). The court in Drybones relied on the Canadian Bill 
of Rights to invalidate the Federal Indian Act. 
81 See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text. 
82 See New Charter, supra note 4, at 286-88. 
83 There is no exact date when Canada became independent from Great Britain. However, by the 
time the Statute of Westminster was enacted in 1931, scholars considered Canada to be an independent 
sovereign. New Charter, supra note 4, at 283 n. 2; M. LALONDE & R. BASFORD, supra note 18, at 10. 
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ada's independence, the formal power to amend the BNA remained with the 
British Parliament.81 In practice, however, Britain only amended the BNA when 
Canada specifically requested and consented to the proposed legislation. 8s 
Between 1926 and 1975, Canada made nine attempts to restructure the BNA 
in order to give its government the authority to amend its own constitution.86 
Every attempt failed since the federal government and the ten provinces were 
unable to reach agreement on an amending formula. 87 Finally, the federal 
government,SS in an attempt to change the procedure by which Canada's Con-
stitution was amended, acted unilaterally and submitted a resolution to Parlia-
ment. The resolution, which consisted of several constitutional amendments, 
contained three parts, including: (1) a provision stripping Great Britain of its 
power to amend the BNA or enact any law for Canada; (2) a formula describing 
how future amendments to Canada's Constitution would be carried out; and 
(3) a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 89 
Several provinces challenged the resolution, questioning the constitutionality 
of the federal government's unilateral action.90 In 1981, the Supreme Court of 
Canada handed down an important decision which addressed this issue.91 Ref-
The Statute of Westminster officially abolished the colonial relationship between Canada and Great 
Britain. LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 10. 
84 G. FAVREAU, supra note 19, at 10. 
ss Id. 
86 M. LALONDE & R. BASFORD, supra note 18, at 10-17. 
R7 LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at II. 
88 Mr. Pierre Trudeau was Prime Minister at this time. 
89 LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 12. 
90 Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Quebec brought actions in their respective court of appeals chal-
lenging the federal government's unilateral action. Id. 
91 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 12.') D.L.R.3d I (1981). 
The Supreme Court of Canada, established under the authority of section 101 of the BNA, has 
been in existence since 1875. Until 1949, however, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, an 
Empire Court, was considered the highest court in Canada. In 1949 a Canadian statute cut off all 
appeals to the Judicial Committee. Since that time the Supreme Court of Canada has been acknowl-
edged as the highest Canadian court. 
The structure of the Canadian judicial system is different from that of the United States. In the 
United States the federal and state courts are separate, each having jurisdiction over different matters. 
The Canadian judicial system lacks this concept of federalism. Canadian federal and provincial courts 
act as a single unit, each having jurisdiction over both federal and provincial law. This type of structure 
provides for a much simpler system with relatively few jurisdictional conflicts. R. DAWSON, supra note 
44, at 383-95. 
The Saskatchewan court system, as outlined by Dawson, exemplifies the Canadian judicial system: 
I. The Supreme Court of Canada (federal court) 
2. The Court of Appeals for Saskatchewan (provincial court with federal appointment of 
judges) 
3. The Court of Queen's Bench for Saskatchewan (a provincial court with federal appointment 
of judges) 
4. The District Court for Saskatchewan (a provincial court with federal appointment of judges) 
5. Minor provincial courts (provincial courts) 
(i) Surrogate courts 
(ii) Provincial magistrates' courts 
(iii)Justices of the peace 
(iv) Other courts 
Id. at 389. 
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erence re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada92 held that the resolution, as a 
matter of law, could be enacted by British Parliament without the consent of 
the provinces.93 However, the court also decided that, as a matter of constitu-
tional convention, the consent of the provinces was required.94 Two months 
after the Supreme Court's decision, the federal government and the provinces 
reached a bilateral agreement on the proposed amendments. 9o 
Finally, on March 29, 1982, the British Parliament enacted the Canada Act, 
1982, which contained the amendments proposed by the resolution. 96 Schedule 
B of the Canada Act, 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, went into 
effect on April 17, 1982. The Charter, though it did not expressly repeal the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, became the primary instrument for the protection of 
civil rights in CanadaY 
B. Structural Analysis of the Charter 
The Charter, unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, is part of the Canadian 
Constitution.98 As part of the supreme law of Canada, it applies to acts of the 
Canadian Parliament as well as acts of the provinciallegislatures.99 Any statute 
inconsistent with provisions in the Charter will be held invalid. loo Even though 
the Charter limits the powers of both Parliament and the provinces, it does not 
change the distribution of governmental power. Parliament and the provinces 
enjoy the same respective legislative powers that the BNA granted to them 
before enactment of the Charter. 101 
92 125 D.L.R.3d I (1981). 
93Id. at 12, 14,49. 
94Id. at 107. The federal government was therefore acting unconstitutionally, by disregarding the 
practice of the Convention, but not illegally. LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 13. 
95 Quebec did not participate in this agreement. Id. at 16. 
96 This was Great Britain's last official act with respect to amending Canada's Constitution. Canada's 
new Constitution can only be amended by the Canadian government in accordance with the newly 
adopted amending formula. See Constitution Act, 1982 §§ 38-49 for the procedure to amend the 
Constitution. 
97 W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 4. 
98Id. 
99Id. at 25. 
100 See Constitution Act, 1982 § 52. Section 52 States: 
(I) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or 
effect. 
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes 
(a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act; 
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the Schedule; and 
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). 
(3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the 
authority contained in the Constitution of Canada. 
101 See LAW PRACTICE REVOLUTIONIZED, supra note 3, at 13. For a discussion of the powers distributed 
to Parliament and the provinces see supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text. 
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Although the Charter has constitutional status, its power is nevertheless lim-
ited by the "override" clause found in section 33.102 Canadian governments, in 
accordance with section 33, have the power to enact legislation which restricts 
individual rights protected by the Charter. 103 A statute that does not comply 
with the provisions in the Charter, however, is required by section 33 to contain 
a specific declaration. This declaration must specify which sections of the 
Charter cannot apply to the statute. 104 Additionally, section 33(3) of the Charter 
limits this override power by making the declaration expire automatically after 
five years. !Os Essentially, the override clause enables the government to tempo-
rarily restrict or limit individual rights guaranteed under the Charter without 
amending the Canadian Constitution. 
Substantively, the Canadian Charter is similar to the U.S. Constitution. Like 
the U.S. Constitution, the Charter has provisions to protect freedom of speech, 
press, and assembly,106 and the right to vote. 107 Both texts specifically protect 
criminal defendants, granting them the right to counsel and a jury trial. lo8 
Furthermore, both instruments contain provisions dealing with unreasonable 
searches and arbitrary arrests,109 double jeopardy,lIO ex post facto laws,llI com-
pulsory self-incrimination,ll2 and cruel and unusual punishment. ll3 
Although the Canadian Charter and the U.S. Constitution are substantively 
similar, there are also some important differences between the instruments. The 
Canadian Charter, unlike the U.S. Constitution, explicitly protects the right to 
leave and enter the country.114 The Charter also emphasizes the multicultural 
heritage of Canada and requires that the Charter be interpreted with this in 
mind. lls The U.S. Constitution does not contain a similar provision. On the 
102 Section 33 of the Charter states in pertinent part: 
(1 )Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament 
or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to IS of this Charter. 
103 W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 10-11. Tarnopolosky also obsevered, however, 
that exercise of the power under section 33 would attract such political opposition that it probably 
would not be used often. ld. at II. 
104ld. at 10-11. 
105 Charter § 33(3). 
106 Charter § 2(a)(b)(c). The right to free expression, in the United States, is protected by the first 
amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights. U.S. CON ST. amend. I. 
107 Charter § 3; U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, XIX. 
108 Charter §§ lO(b) , II(f); U.S. CaNST. amend. VI and art. Ill, § 2, cl.3. 
109 Charter §§ 8, 9; U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
110 Charter § 11th); U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
III Charter § 11 (g); U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
112 Charter § II(c); U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
113 Charter § 12; U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII. 
114 Charter § 6(1). U.S. Supreme Court decisions have, nevertheless, held that these rights should 
receive constitutional protection. For U.S. decisions concerning mobility rights see United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
115 Charter § 27. 
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other hand, the Charter does not contain language comparable to the first 
amendment establishment clause. 116 Finally, while the U.S. Constitution ex-
pressly protects property rights, the Charter makes no mention of such a 
constitutional right. 1I7 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the rights guaranteed under the 
U.S. Constitution as limited to protecting individuals from governmental ac-
tion."B Therefore, in the United States, private discrimination or private inter-
ference with an individual's right to free speech or religion does not raise 
constitutional questions. 1I9 At least one commentator has also interpreted the 
Canadian Charter as protecting individuals from governmental action only.120 
The Canadian Parliament enacted the Charter as a constitutional amendment. 
As a result civil rights in Canada are now guaranteed constitutional protection. 
Pursuant to section 24 of the Charter, U[a]nyone whose rights and freedoms as 
guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
... to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances."121 Despite the language contained in section 24 of the Charter, 
116 u.s. CON ST. amend. I. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no laws respect-
ing an establishment of religion .... " 
117 The U.S. due process clause, for example, applies to deprivations of "life, liberty or property." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The corresponding language in the Charter covers deprivation of "life, 
liberty and security of person." Charter § 7. The U.S. fifth amendment provides that "private property" 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Charter has no counterpart. 
118 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Furthermore, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 
by their own terms, make it clear that the U.S. Constitution protects individuals only from govern-
mental action. The fourteenth amendment states in part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law .... 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
The fifteenth amendment states in part: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added). 
The question of what constitutes state action has generated considerable litigation. It is clear that 
governmental action includes federal, state, and local legislation. It also includes the regulations, 
internal policies, and official activities of governmental agencies. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, 
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-525 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. 
Slavery or involuntary servitude are exceptions to the rule that the U.S. Constitution protects 
individuals from governmental action only. The thirteenth amendment restricts private as well as 
governmental action in this area. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
119 Although private invasion of rights does not generally violate the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
may nevertheless enact federal statutes to prohibit it. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. 
L. 88-352 prohibits racial and gender discrimination in private employment, hotels, restaurants, and 
theaters. In addition, the Federal Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 
prohibits race and gender discrimination in the sale or rental of private housing. 
120 Bender, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Bill of Rights: A Comparison, 
28 MCGILL L.J. 811, 829-32 (1983). 
121 Constitution Act, 1982 § 24. 
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courts will not invalidate all legislation which restrict individual rights. Section 
one of the Charter makes it clear that reasonable restrictions on the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter will be permitted. 122 Thus, the Charter 
has given Canadian courts a new role. They are now responsible for determining 
the nature and limit of Canadian civil rights. Since the Charter and the U.S. 
Bill of Rights contain similar provisions, commentators have suggested that 
Canadian courts might rely on u.S. jurisprudence to help determine whether 
a protected right has been unconstitutionally restricted. 123 The following section 
will examine the extent to which Canadian courts have relied on U.S. court 
decisions to interpret the Charter. 
IV. U.S. INFLUENCE ON CANADIAN DECISIONS 
A. Freedom of Expression 
There has been an enormous amount of litigation involving freedom of 
expression in the United States. Freedom of expression is protected by the first 
amendment of the U.S. Constitution which states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press .... 124 
The right to free speech is an important issue since it is one of the "preeminent 
rights of Western democratic theory, a touchstone of individualliberty."125 U.S. 
courts have developed several tests to determine whether an individual's right 
to free expression has been unconstitutionally restricted. These tests include: 
(1) the least restrictive means test;126 (2) the clear and present danger test;127 (3) 
the overbreadth doctrine; 128 and (4) the concept of prior restraint versus pro-
hibition. 129 
Courts have adopted the least restrictive means test to help protect first 
amendment rights. Under this approach, the court first concedes that a statutory 
restriction, placed on an individual's constitutionally protected right of free 
122 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
m Beckton, supra note 10, at 112; R. McLEOD, supra note 7, at 2-103. 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
125 Dunagin v. City of Oxford Miss., 489 F. Supp. 763, 769 (N.D. Miss 1980)(quoting J. NOWAK, R. 
ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 712 (1978)). 
126 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
127 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (l969)(per curiam); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252 (1941); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
128 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601 (1973); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
129 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. U.S., 
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
1986) CANADIAN CHARTER 87 
speech, is necessary since there is a compelling state interest which is legitimately 
being pursued. 130 However, the court also determines that the compelling state 
interest can be accomplished in a less restrictive way.l3l The court, therefore, 
will strike down the statute as unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 132 applying the least restrictive means 
test, struck down an Arkansas statute which required teachers to list annually 
every organization to which they belonged or contributed in the past five 
years. 133 The Court agreed that the state had an interest in investigating the 
competence and fitness of its teachers, but concluded that the statute went 
beyond legitimate purposes. 134 The information filed pursuant to the statute 
was not kept confidential, allowing public exposure and the risk of offending 
superiors by belonging to an unpopular group. In addition, the requirement 
that teachers list every organization to which they belonged often had no rele-
vance to the teachers' fitness for the job. 135 The Court, therefore, held the 
Arkansas statute to be unconstitutional. 136 
To determine the constitutionality of governmental restrictions on public 
speeches, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed the clear and present danger 
test. The Court in Bridges v. California 137 articulated the standard to be used in 
this test: 
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is 
a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely 
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utter-
ances can be punished. 138 
Thus, based on the Bridges decision, speech could be constitutionally restricted 
if the court decided that harm might result from that speech. 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, have moved away from the clear 
and present danger test. The Court in Brandenberg v. Ohio 139 used a different 
test to determine whether inciteful speech could be constitutionally restricted. 
Striking down an Ohio statute which forbade the advocacy of violence as a 
130 See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485. 
lSI The court striking down a statute, based on the least restrictive means test, is not required to 
specify what less restrictive approach would be acceptable. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
132 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
133 [d. at 490. 
134 !d. at 485. 
135 [d. at 488. 
136 The Shelton Court stated that the statute was "unlimited and indiscriminate" in its sweep, and 
went beyond "what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness 
and competence of its teachers." [d. at 490. 
137 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
138 [d. at 263. 
139 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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means of accomplishing industrial or political reform, the Court held that 
speech advocating the use of force or crime can only be prohibited if two 
conditions are satisfied. First, the speech must be directed at "inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action."I40 Second, the speech must be "likely to incite 
or produce such action."141 The Court held that the Ohio statute was unconsti-
tutional since it punished individuals who advocated violent political change in 
an abstract manner so as not to incite imminent unlawful action.I42 
Courts have also used the overbreadth doctrine to strike down legislation 
restricting individuals' first amendment rights. I43 Under this approach, the 
courts will invalidate a statute if it limits, in addition to constitutionally unpro-
tected activities, rights protected by the first amendment. l44 The Supreme Court 
in U.S. v. Robell45 applying the overbreadth doctrine, found section 5(a)(l)(D) 
of the Subversive Activities Control Act I46 unconstitutional. Section 5(a)(l)(D) 
of the Act made it a crime for any member of a communist-action group to 
engage in any employment in any defense facility, with the knowledge that a 
final registration order was in force for that particular group. The Court ac-
knowledged that the purpose of section 5(a)(l)(D), to reduce the threat of 
sabotage and espionage in defense plants, was appropriate. I47 The Court, how-
ever, concluded that the section was invalid since it also had the effect of 
restricting an individual's first amendment right to free association. l48 Section 
5(a)(l)(D) reached persons occupying non-sensitive positions in a defense facility 
and passive as well as active members of a designated communist group.I49 Since 
the statute prohibited protected as well as unprotected associational rights, the 
Robel Court declared section 5(a)(l)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act 
unconstitutional. 150 
The overbreadth doctrine has been adopted by U.S. courts to prevent the 
erosion of protected speech. I51 It encourages Congress to enact narrowly de-
14°ld. at 447. 
14Ild. The continuing influence of the clear and present danger test is demonstrated by the require-
ment that the speech be "likely to incite or produce" imminent unlawful action. 
142 !d. at 449. In spite of this new approach, no statute restricting political speech has been found 
unconstitutional since 1965. 
143 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (19'74); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601 (1973); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
144 NOWAK, supra note 118, at 867-71. 
145 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
146 Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1982). 
147 Robel, 389 U.S. at 264. 
148 [d. at 264, 268. 
149 [d. at 266. 
150 [d. at 268. The Supreme Court in Broadrick, however, has limited the use of the overbreadth 
doctrine in first amendment cases, requiring the overbreadth of the statute "not only to be real, but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 
615. 
151 W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 84. 
1986] CANADIAN CHARTER 89 
fined legislation which restricts only constitutionally unprotected activities. '52 
Courts will strike down a statute under this approach even if it is being chal-
lenged by a party whose restricted conduct is not constitutionally protected. '53 
Finally, courts have held that prior restraints on First Amendment rights are 
more objectionable than punishment after the fact. '54 Courts are reluctant to 
allow prior restrictions since they constitute "immediate and irreversible sanc-
tion[s]."'55 The Supreme Court has established a strong presumption against 
the constitutional validity of a prior restraint statute. 156 In Near v. Minnesota,'57 
the Court indicated that prior restraints could only be permitted in exceptional 
circumstances such as with speeches inciting violence, speeches using obscenity, 
and in times of war.158 
The Supreme Court has also determined that certain types of speech are not 
protected by the first amendment. Justice Murphy in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire '59 observed that there are several kinds of speech which when re-
stricted do not raise constitutional questions. 160 Categories of speech that are 
not constitutionally protected include: (1) the lewd and obscene; (2) the profane; 
(3) the libelous; and (4) the insulting or fighting words. 161 The Court noted that 
these areas of speech contain very little social value. Restrictions on these types 
of speech are therefore appropriate since "any benefit [that] may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."'62 
The first amendment also guarantees freedom of the press. Although free-
dom of the press is protected under the concept of free expression, the Supreme 
Court has, nevertheless, granted greater protections for the press than for 
individuals. '63 These additional protections have focused primarily on the right 
of the press to acquire and disseminate information. '64 For example, the Court 
in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart l65 held that pretrial orders, prohibiting the press 
from publishing certain types of information about the case, were unconstitu-
tional. '66 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 167 
152 /d. 
153 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). For general discussion on the overbreadth 
doctrine see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). 
154 Nebraska Press Association, 427 U.S. at 559. 
155 Id. 
156 Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
157 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
158Id. at 716. 
159 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
160Id. at 571. 
161Id. 
162/d. at 572. 
163 W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 95. 
164/d. 
165 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
166 Id. at 570. 
167 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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upheld the press's right of access to criminal trials. 168 The Court's reason for 
granting additional protection to the press is that it has the ultimate effect of 
preserving and fostering individual rights of free expression. 169 
The Canadian Charter also protects the right to free expression. Section 2(b) 
of the Charter states: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication[.JI7o 
Section 2(b) of the Charter did not create a new right for its citizens. Canadian 
law has always recognized the existence of the fundamental right to free 
speech. 171 During the period between the late 1930s and the late 1950s, the 
Canadian courts used the implied bill of rights doctrine to protect an individual's 
right to free expression. 172 Furthermore, the Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted 
in 1960, explicitly recognized the right to free expression. 173 Section 2(b) of the 
Charter raised this right to the status of a constitutionally protected right. 
Since the enactment of the Charter in 1982, there has been a substantial 
amount of litigation involving freedom of expression in CanadaY4 Canadian 
courts have already addressed many issues regarding section 2(b) ofthe Charter. 
Some of these decisions have dealt with: (1) restrictions on obscenity;175 (2) the 
right of litigants to be represented by a lawyer of their choice; 176 (3) trademark 
167 448 U,S. 555 (1980). 
168 [d. at 581. The right of access to criminal trials is not absolute. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the Supreme Court held that denial of access to a criminal trial 
is permissible if it is "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest." 4.57 U.S. at 607. 
169 W. TARNOPOLSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, supra note 4, at 95. 
170 Charter § 2(b). 
171 The court in Regina v. Reed, 8 C.C.C. 3d 153 (1983), stated that while Canadian law has always 
recognized the existence of fundamental freedoms, it has also upheld the need for justifiable restric-
tions. [d. at 161. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 for a discussion of the Canadian implied bill of rights. 
173 Section I(d) and I(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights states: 
I. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue 
to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, color, religion or sex, the 
following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, 
(d) freedom of speech; 
(f) freedom of the press. 
174 See generally R. McLEOD, supra note 7; THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED, supra 
note 7. 
l75 See, e.g., Re Luscher and Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada Customs and Excise, 149 D.L.R.3d 
243 (1983); Re Cote and Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise (May 18, 
1984), reported in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 9.2-11. 
176 See Malartic Hygrade Gold Mines Ltd. v. The Queen In Right Of Quebec, 142 D.L.R.3d 512 
(1982). 
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infringement;177 (4) limitations on commercial expression;178 and (5) advertising 
regulations affecting a professional group.179 
To help determine whether an individual's right to free speech has been 
unconstitutionally restricted, the Canadian courts have adopted the U.S. over-
breadth doctrine. 1Bo The court in Re Red Hot Video Ltd. and City of Vancouver,181 
applied this U.S. overbreadth test to a Vancouver statute, which defined the 
types of "sex-orientated products" that could not be sold or rented by mer-
chants. 182 The statute restricted products depicting a person or persons engag-
ing in real or simulated sex acts, and items which simulated or were a repro-
duction of any human sex organ in any type of sexual activity.IB3 
The court noted that "sex-orientated products," by itself, was an indiscrimi-
nately broad expression. 1B4 The court concluded, however, that the statute 
sufficiently limited the term's application to two specific types of products. 185 In 
addition, the court determined that the statute exempted from regulation any 
sex-oriented product found to be educational or pharmaceuticaJ.186 Since the 
challenged law restricted only those activities that it intended to regulate, the 
court held that the statute was not overbroad and was, therefore, constitu-
tional. 187 
The court in Re Ontario Film & Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of 
Censors 188 held sections of the Theatres Act of 1980189 "to be of no force or 
effect" based on the U.S. overbreadth doctrine. 190 Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the 
Theatres Act of 1980 gave the Ontario Board of Censors the power "to censor 
any film" and "to approve, prohibit or regulate the exhibition of any film in 
177 See Source Perrier (Societe Anonyme) v. Fira-Less Marketing Co. (1983), 70 C.P.R. (2d) (F.C.T.D.) 
reported in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED. supra note 7, at 9.2-2. 
178 See Regina v. Halpert, 9 C.C.C.3d 411 (1983). 
179 See Re Law Society of Manitoba and Savino, I D.L.R.4th 285 (1983). 
180 The court in Re Red Hot Video Ltd. and City of Vancouver, 5 D.L.R.4th 61 (1983), explicitly 
recognized that the U.S. overbreadth test has gained acceptance in Canada. [d. at 65. For a discussion 
of the U.S. overbreadth doctrine see supra text accompanying notes 143-53. 
181 5 D.L.R.4th 61 (1983). 
182 The challenged Vancouver statute stated: 
Wherever the words "retail store", "retail or business establishment", "retailing", "convenience 
commercial", or similar use descriptions which imply the sale of merchandise as a permitted 
use, appear in this By-law or in any By-law passed pursuant to this By-law, such permitted 
use shall not include the sale or rent of sex-oriented products. 
By-law 3575 § 10.22.1, cited in Re Red Hot Video, 5 D.L.R.4th at 63. 
183 Re Red Hot Video, 5 D.L.R.4th at 65. 
184 !d. at 63. 
185 !d. at 65. 
186 !d. at 66. 
187 See id. at 66. 
188 147 D.L.R.3d 58 (1983). 
189 Theatres Act, R.S.O. 1980 c. 498 §§ 3(2)(a), (b), 35, 38. 
190 Re Ontario Film, 147 D.L.R.3d at 68. See Re Red Hot Video, 5 D.L.R.4th at 65 (noting that Re 
Ontario Film determined the validity of the Theatres Act by applying the U.S. overbreadth doctrine). 
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Ontario."191 The court noted that the Theatres Act intended to prevent public 
screening of socially offensive films.192 The Act, however, did not require the 
board of censors to use any specific standards or regulations to determine 
whether a film should be censored. 193 The court determined that the Theatres 
Act of 1980 was too broad, thereby violating section one of the Charter. 194 The 
court reasoned that in order for a statute to be constitutional its limitations must 
be articulated clearly and precisely. I", 
The judiciary in Canada has also been influenced by U.S. jurisprudence when 
deciding constitutional issues of freedom of the press. l96 To determine the 
extent of constitutional protection afforded the Canadian press, the court in Re 
Edmonton Journal and Attorney-General for Alberta l97 compared the language in 
the U.S. Constitution, protecting freedom of the press, with similar language 
in the Charter. The first amendment of the U.S. Constitution protecting the 
freedom of the press states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press .... "198 The Canadian Charter addresses 
the same issue by stating: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication[.jI99 
The U.S. Constitution clearly separates the right to free speech from the right 
of freedom of the press. The drafters of the Charter, however, did not differ-
entiate between freedom of the press and the other rights protected under the 
same section. Noting this distinction, the court in Re Edmonton Journal deter-
mined that freedom of the press is not a separate right within the Canadian 
system.200 Instead, freedom of the press is protected only by the right to free 
expression.201 Section 2(b), therefore, guarantees individuals the right to express 
themselves orally, in writing, or in any other way including the use of the media. 
191 Theatres Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 498 §§ 3(2)(a), (b). Section 35 of the Act requires that, before being 
exhibited in Ontario, all films must be submitted to the Board for approval. Section 38 of the Act 
requires that no person shall exhibit a film in Ontario that has not been approved by the board. 
192 He Ontario Film, 147 D.L.R.3d at 65. 
19:1 fri. at 07. 
'" fd. See also sllpra text accompanying note 6. 
19; He Ontario Film, 147 D.L.R.3d at 67. 
1% See Rc Edmonton Journal and Attorney-General for Alberta, 4 C.C.C.3d 59 (1983); Re Southam 
Inc. and The Queen (No. 1),3 C.C.C.3d 515 (1983); Re Canadian Newspapers Co. and The Queen, 
6 C.C.C.3d 488 (1983). 
197 4 C.C.C.3d 59 (1983). 
19S U.S. CON ST. amend. I. 
199 Charter § 2(b) (emphasis added). 
,,>I, 4 C.C.C.3d at 63. 
"" !d. at 62. 
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The court concluded that section 2(b) does not, however, include a separate 
freedom specifically designed to protect the press.202 
Several Canadian cases, influenced by U.S. decisions, have addressed the issue 
of freedom of expression and the right of the press to observe public trials. 203 
The decisions in Re Southam Inc. and The Queen and Re Canadian Newspapers Co. 
and The Queen, held section 12(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act,204 which 
restricts access of the press from juvenile trials, to be unconstitutional. 205 This 
right of access to public trials was decided by the Re Canadian Newspapers court 
based on several factors. 206 First, a rule favoring an open court system would 
help foster public confidence in the integrity of the legal system.207 Second, 
Canadian society even as early as 1909 recognized the importance of making 
court proceedings universally known.208 Third, many considered an open court 
system to be the hallmark of a democratic society.2og Fourth, pre-Charter court 
decisions considered open trials of the utmost importance, even though such 
an approach caused inconvenience to the individual on tria\.2l0 Finally, the court 
relied on the U.S. decision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia2ll in holding 
that juvenile proceedings in Canada should be open to the public.212 
The U.S. Richmond Newspapers case was, in fact, cited by both the Re Southam 
and Re Canadian Newspapers courts in their analyses of the constitutionality of 
section 12(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act.2I3 Richmond Newspapers was the 
first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the right of the 
public and press to attend criminal trials was constitutionally protected. 2l4 The 
Court concluded that, absent any overriding governmental interest, the first 
amendment requires that criminal trials be open to the public.215 Writing for 
the majority in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger stressed that criminal 
proceedings have traditionally been open to the public and that this tradition 
202 The court in Re Edmonton journal applied this analysis upholding the constitutionality of section 
12(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, which restricts access of the press from juvenile trials. [d. at 
65-66. 
203 See Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No. 1).3 C.C.C.3d 515 (1983); Re Canadian Newspapers 
Co. and The Queen, 6 C.C.C.3d 488 (1983). 
204 Juvenile Delinquents Act R.S. c. 160, § I. 
205 Re Southam, 3 C.C.C.3d at 536; Re Canadian Newspapers, 6 C.C.C.3d at 498. But see Re Edmonton 
journal, 4 C.C.C.3d at 66 (discussed supra at notes 197-202 and accompanying text). 
206 Re Canadian Newspapers, 6 C.C.C.3d at 494-96 (relying on factors set forth in Re Southam, 3 
C.C.C.3d at 521-25). 
207/d. at 496. 
208Id. at 494. 
209 [d. 
210 /d. 
211 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
212 Re Canadian Newspapers, 6 C.C.C.3d at 495-96. 
213 Re Southam. 3 C.C.C.3d at 524; Re Canadian Newspapers, 6 C.C.C.3d at 495. 
214 Re Southam. 3 C.C.C.3d at 524. 
215 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. 
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was well in place even at the time the first amendment was adopted.216 Relying 
on this decision, the courts in Re Southam and Re Canadian Newspapers held that 
section 12(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act was an unreasonable restriction 
on the rights guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter.217 
U.S. decisions have also influenced Canadian cases on the issue of how broadly 
section two of the Charter should be interpreted. 218 The Canadian court in 
Baxter v. Baxter219 determined that the rights and freedoms under the Charter 
should be interpreted in terms of what restrictions the government was prohib-
ited from imposing on the individual. The court concluded that it would not 
be appropriate to use section two of the Charter to require the government to 
provide certain affirmative actions for the individua\.220 The Baxter court thus 
held that a husband could not require the state to exempt his marriage from 
the Divorce Act of 1970,221 even though the husband felt that the Act violated 
his religious rights protected by section 2(a) of the Charter.222 In its holding, 
the court specifically relied on the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sherbert v. 
Verner.223 The Baxter decision, paraphrasing Justice Douglas'S opinion in Sherbert, 
stated that the "Charter is written in terms of what the State cannot do to the 
individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the State."224 
Canadian courts have relied on U.S. jurisprudence to interpret section two 
of the Charter. They have made use of the U.S. overbreadth doctrine to help 
determine whether legislation restricting an individual's right to free expression 
is constitutional. In addition, several Canadian cases have relied on U.S. deci-
sions in reaching their own decisions to require juvenile proceedings in Canada 
to be open to the public. Furthermore, a Canadian court engaged in an extensive 
analysis between the language in section two of the Charter and similar language 
contained in the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, to determine the 
extent of constitutional protection afforded to the Canadian press. Finally, at 
least one Canadian court, basing its decision on a U.S. Supreme Court case, has 
held that section two of the Charter should be interpreted only with respect to 
the constitutionality of governmental restrictions. The court concluded that, 
like the U.S. Constitution, the Charter was not to be interpreted in terms of 
what affirmative actions an individual could expect from its government. 
216Id. at 564. 
217 Re Southam, 3 C.C.C.3d at 524-25; Re Canadian Newspapers, 6 C.C.C.3d at 496. 
218 Section two of the Charter protects freedom of expression. See supra text accompanying note 
170. 
m 6 C.C.C.3d 165 (1983). 
22oId. at 168. 
221 Divorce Act. 1967-68, c. 24, § I. 
222 Baxter, 6 C.R. R. at 166. 
223 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
224 Baxter, 6 C.R.R. at 168. 
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B. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees individ-
uals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The fourth amendment 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.225 
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is based on the concept 
of privacy.226 Therefore, there has been a search within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment if an individual can prove that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy has been invaded by the state.227 
U.S. courts have adopted the general rule that searches are reasonable, and 
constitutional, if carried out pursuant to a warrant. 228 Warrantless searches, on 
the other hand, are per .Ie unreasonable and unconstitutional. The courts, how-
ever, have carved out several exceptions to this general rule. 229 Warrantless 
searches which are nevertheless considered reasonable include: (1) a search 
incident to an arrest;230 (2) a search accompanying a "hot pursuit;"231 (3) a "stop 
and frisk" search;232 (4) a search of a vehicle held in police custody;233 (5) a 
search to prevent loss of evidence;234 (6) a search where the party consents;235 
and (7) a search where the object is in "plain view."23G 
22.i u.s. CaNST. amend. IV. 
226 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.s. 347 (1967). The court in Katz stated: 
[TJhe fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office. is not a subject of fourth amendment protection 
.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public. may 
be constitutionally protected. 
ld. at 35 I (citations omitted). 
227Id. at 361 (Harlan, j., concurring). 
'2' See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). A warrant can only be issued after "probable 
cause" has been established. For there to be probable cause to search a particular area it must be 
proven that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and the items will be found in the 
place to be searched. A warrant is valid only when issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. See 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
"0 See Perry & :'kisser, Criminal Procedure, 1980 ANN. SVRV. AM. L. 265, 278-82 (1980). 
230 See, eg., U.S. V. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
231 See, e.g., U.S. V. Sanata, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
232 See, e.g., Terry V. Ohio. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
m See, e.g., Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
234 See. e.g., Carrol V. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
235 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
2% See, e.g., Coolidge V. t\'ew Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). For a complete discussion regarding 
search and seizure see YV. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
96 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.1 
The Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States237 developed the exclusionary 
rule, holding that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights is inadmissible in court against the defendant. 238 In Terry v. Ohio,239 
the Court cited two major reasons for the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. First, exclusion acts to deter 
future violations of the Constitution.240 Second, the integrity of the judicial 
system would diminish if the courts allowed the government to violate consti-
tutional rights. 241 In recent years, however, commentators have criticized the 
use of the exclusionary rule242 and the Supreme Court has handed down several 
decisions limiting its scope.243 
In Canada, the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure is 
constitutionally protected by section 8 of the Charter. Section 8 states that 
"[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure."244 
The Charter, however, is not responsible for introducing this concept into 
Canadian society. The right to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures was established by Canadian common law before the enactment of the 
Charter.245 The common law decisions gave police officers and government 
officials the authority to enter private property, to search for and seize evidence, 
only if such action was authorized by a statute.246 The common law rule, there-
fore, considered a search or seizure reasonable and permissible as long as it was 
authorized by law.247 
(1978); C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 
13-254 (1980); Note, An Emerging New Standard for Warrantless Searches and Seizures Based on Terry v. 
Ohio, 35 MERCER L. REV. 647-80 (1984); Wilson, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Original Under-
standing, 28 CATH. LAW. 173-98 (1983). 
237 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
238 See id. at 398. 
239 392 U.S. I (1968). 
24oId. at 12. 
241 Id. 
242 See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974); Wilkey, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY 
INJUSTICE (1977). 
2"See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984); U.S. v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 
5155 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984); Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). For a general discussion on the U.S. 
exclusionary rule see Note, The Exclusionary Rule and a Good-Faith Exception: Is it Time for a Change? 35 
MERCER L. REV. 699 (1984); Fitzhugh, The New Exclusionary Rule Cases, 70 A.B.A.]. 58 (1984); Note, 
The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1981); Oaks, Studying 
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizures, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). 
244 Charter § 8. 
245 McGinn. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Its Impact on Law Enforcement, 31 U.N.B.L.]. 
177, 185 (1982). The Canadian Bill of Rights, however, does not contain a provision protecting 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
246 P. HOGG ANNOTATED, supra note 4, at 29. 
247 See Levitz v. Ryan, 9 C.C.C.2d 182 (1972); McGinn, supra note 245, at 185. 
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Initially, section 8 of the Charter contained language which indicated that the 
"reasonable if legal" approach would continue to apply to searches and seizures. 
An early version of section 8 stated that "[elveryone has the right not to be 
subjected to search or seizure except on grounds and in accordance with pro-
cedures established by law."248 The framers of the Charter decided that this 
approach did not provide enough protection for the individuaJ.249 Section 8 was 
redrafted to broaden the meaning of unreasonableness with respect to searches 
and seizures. The final version of section 8 gives the Canadian courts the 
authority to also determine whether the legislation permitting a search or seizure 
is itself unreasonable.250 The Minutes of Proceedings before the Joint Commit-
tee, furthermore, makes it clear that Parliament intended section 8 to have as 
broad a scope as the fourth amendment's search and seizure provision.25I 
The Canadian case of Re Becker and The Queen in Right of Alberta252 determined 
that the word "seizure" in the Charter does not encompass real property 
rights. 253 The court based its decision on an extensive analysis between the 
language in the fourth and fifth amendments of the U.S. Constitution and 
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. 254 Both section 8 and the fourth amendment 
state that individuals have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.255 A comparison of section 7 and the fifth amendment, however, shows 
important differences. The legal rights protected by the Charter, set out in 
section 7, include: "the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof."256 In comparison the fifth amendment states 
that a person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."257 Unlike the fifth amendment, section 7 of the Charter does 
not include a property right among the constitutionally protected rights. 
Based on the comparison between the two instruments, the court in Re Becker 
and The Queen held that the word "seizure" in section 8 of the Charter does not 
encompass real property rights. 258 The court reasoned that sections 8 through 
14 of the Charter refer to the general rights created by section 7.259 If the 
framers of the Charter intended section 8 to protect property rights they would 
248 Minutes of Proceedings November 18, 1980. Vol. 7 at II, reported in McGinn, supra note 245, at 
185. 
249 [d. at 186. 
250 [d. For the language of the final version of section 8. see supra text accompanying note 244. 
251 McGinn, supra note 245, at 186-87. 
252 148 D.L.R.3d 539 (1983). 
253 !d. at 545. 
254 See id. at 543-44. 
255 See text accompanying notes 225 and 244. 
256 Charter § 7. 
257 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
258 148 D.L.R.3d at 545. 
259 !d. at 544. 
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have included this right in section 7, as the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
did in their fifth amendment. 26o 
Unlike the U.S. courts, Canadian courts have not accepted the notion that 
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is based on the concept 
of privacy. In R. v. Taylor,261 the court specifically rejected the U.S. approach 
and stated that the Charter was not written with the intent to protect a right of 
privacy.262 The court reasoned that the framers would have used broader lan-
guage if they had intended section 8 to extend beyond the ordinary meaning 
of search and seizure. 263 
Since section 8 of the Charter does not contain a warrant clause, Canadian 
courts have focused on the more general issue of reasonableness to determine 
whether a search or seizure is constitutional.264 The courts have adopted a 
balancing approach, used by the United States court system, to determine 
whether a search or seizure is reasonable. 265 Under this U.S. balancing approach, 
the court will determine whether a seizure is reasonable by weighing the degree 
of governmental intrusion against the government's legitimate interest in con-
ducting the search.266 The court, in effect, balances the "public interest in 
effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure."267 
The Canadian courts applying this balancing approach have reached the same 
results as U.S. courts on identical issues. For instance, both Canadian and U.S. 
courts have determined that taking fingerprints after a lawful arrest is not an 
260Id. at 544-45. 
261 B.C.S.C., December 30, 1983, reported in R. McLEOD, supra note 7, at 6-17. 
262Id. 
263/d. The court in Ziegler v. Hunter, Fed. T.D., August 9, 1983, reported in R. McLEOD, supra note 
7, at 6-3 also refused to find an implied right of privacy for section 8 of the Charter. Furthermore, 
the court in Regina v. Porter (January 17, 1983),9 W.C.B. 311 (B.C. Co. Ct.), reported in THE CANADIAN 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 13-20, made it clear that for a search and seizure 
to be unreasonable within the context of section 8 of the Charter, there must be a physical taking of 
property. The court, therefore, held that entry into an individual's home, without consent or a warrant, 
and the implantation of surveillance equipment, was not a violation of section 8. Id. The Charter's 
legislative history supports the approach taken by these Canadian courts. The original draft of the 
Charter contained a provision, equivalent to section 8, which would have specifically protected arbitrary 
and unlawful interference with privacy. R. McLEOD, supra note 7, at 6-2. The final version of the 
Charter does not contain this provision. Id. 
264 Issuance of a search warrant, nevertheless, can be an important factor when determining the 
reasonableness of a search and seizure. Regina v. Rao (May 16, 1984), 12 W.C.B. 118 (Ont. C.A.), 
reported in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 13-49. 
265 See Re New Garden Restaurant & Tavern Ltd. and Minister of National Revenue, 1 D.L.R.4th 
256 (1983); Re Maltby and Attorney-General of Saskatchewan, 143 D.L.R.3d 649 (1982); Regina v. 
McGregor, 3 C.C.C.3d 200 (1983). 
266 McGregor, 3 C.C.C.3d at 209. 
267 Re New Garden Restaurant, 1 D.L.R.4th at 261. The court adopted the balancing test used in the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
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unreasonable search.268 U.S. courts have held that fingerprinting lawfully de-
tained individuals does not sufficiently infringe upon fourth amendment rights 
to constitute an unreasonable search.269 The Canadian case of Regina v. Mc-
Gregor270 has similarly reasoned that mandatory fingerprinting is not unconsti-
tutional since the public interest involved outweighs section 8 rights of a de-
tained individual.27I Bothjudicial systems have also concluded that strip searches 
imposed upon prison inmates after visits are not unreasonable. 272 
The Canadian courts have also made use of the United States plain view 
doctrine to help determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable.273 The 
court in Re Regina and Shea274 held that the seizure of any item in plain view, 
made while in the process of conducting a constitutional search, is reasonable. 275 
As a result, a policeman who lawfully entered an apartment to help aid a 
landlord in an emergency conducted a reasonable seizure when he unexpectedly 
discovered and confiscated narcotics. 276 The court, justifying the use of the plain 
268 U.S. cases deciding the issue of search and seizure and fingerprinting include: Paulson v. State 
of Florida, 360 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). The Canadian 
case deciding the same issue is Regina v. McGregor, 3 C.C.C.3d 200 (1983). 
269 See Paulson v. State of Florida, 360 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721 (1969). 
270 3 C.C.C.3d 200 (1983). 
271 !d. at 209-10. 
272 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Re Maltby and Attorney·General of Saskatchewan, 143 
D.L.R. 3d 649 (1982). 
The Bell court reasoned: 
The test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is not capable of precise definition 
or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular 
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider 
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification 
for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted .... A detention facility is a unique 
place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other 
contraband is all too common an occurrence .... [W]e deal here with the question whether 
visual body cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be conducted on 
less than probable cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the 
institution against the privacy interests of the immates we conclude that they can. 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-61. 
The Canadian court in Re Maltlr; agreed with the reasoning in Bell and also observed: 
In this day and age, knowing full well the extent of the drug scene, controls must be in effect 
to ensure the security of the institution and the strip searches requested of remand inmates 
before they are returned to the remand unit following a visit are no more than a minimum 
reasonable requirement. Certainly no violation of the provisions of the Charter of Rights is 
involved. 
Re Maltby, 143 D.L.R.3d at 661. 
273 See, e.g., Re Regina and Shea, 1 C.C.C.3d 316 (1982). The court in Shea also noted that Canadian 
courts have used the plain view doctrine before and after the enactment of the Charter. Shea, 1 
C.C.C.3d at 322. 
2741 C.C.C.3d 316 (1982). 
275Id. at 321-22. 
276 !d. 
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view doctrine, cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire277 
which stated: 
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer 
in each of them had prior justification for an intrusion in the course 
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incrimi-
nating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior 
justification ... and permits the warrantless seizure. 278 
Section 24 of the Charter provides for the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence in cases where admission of such evidence would bring the adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute. 279 The courts in R. v. Collins280 and R. v. Cohen281 
have developed a test which narrowly defines the type of evidence, which, if 
admitted, would discredit the administration of justice. Under this test only 
evidence obtained by police conduct in a manner which is shocking to the 
community is inadmissible.282 Thus, evidence obtained in violation of section 8 
of the Charter is, nevertheless, admissible as long as the police did not obtain 
it in a shocking manner. 
Dissatisfaction with the U.S. exclusionary rule was one of the major reasons 
why the Collins court limited the scope of the exclusion clause in section 24 of 
the Charter. 283 The court noted that the U.S. experience with the exclusionary 
rule demonstrated its detrimental effect on the judicial system.284 It caused 
society to become enraged with the legal process since many times it allowed 
the criminal to go free as the result of a relatively small error by the police 
officer. 285 Based on these observations, the court concluded that section 24 of 
the Charter should be interpreted as only a modified exclusionary rule. 286 
Canadian courts have, to some extent, relied on U.S. jurisprudence in inter-
preting section ll(b) of the Charter. They have adopted both the U.S. balancing 
test and the U.S. plain view doctrine to help determine whether a search and 
277 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
278 !d. at 466, cited in Shea, 1 C.C.C.3d at 322. 
279 Charter § 24. Section 24 states: 
(I) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or 
denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (I), a court concludes that evidence was obtained 
in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the 
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the 
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
280 33 C.R.3d 130 (1983). 
281 33 C.R.3d 151 (1983). 
2B2 Collins, 33 C.R.3d at 142-43. 
283 !d. at 145-49. 
284 Id. at 148. 
285 [d. at 148-49 (quoting Kaplan, supra note 242, at 1036). 
2B6[d. at 138. 
1986) CANADIAN CHARTER 101 
seizure is reasonable. In addition, one Canadian court made an extensive com-
parative analysis between the fourth and fifth amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution and sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, in determining whether the word 
seizure in section 8 encompassed real property rights. The Canadian courts, 
however, have specifically rejected the U.S. approach which bases searches and 
seizures on the concept of privacy. Furthermore, Canadian courts have con-
cluded that the exclusion clause in section 24 of the Charter should be inter-
preted as only a modified U.S. exclusionary rule. 
C. Trial Within A Reasonable Time 
The sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees an individual the 
right to a trial within a reasonable time. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial .... "287 Although the right to a speedy trial is an important constitutional 
right, it has been hard to define. Conceptually, it is more vague than other 
constitutional rights and cannot be characterized or quantified in exact terms. 288 
For this reason, courts have not been able to determine an exact time limit past 
which this right has been violated. 
The current approach taken by U.S. courts, with respect to sixth amendment 
rights, was established by the Supreme Court in the case of Barker v. Wingo. 289 
In a unanimous opinion the Court held that the primary burden remains on 
both the courts and prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial in a 
speedy manner. 290 The Court developed a balancing test to help determine 
whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been unconstitutionally violated. 
The test consists of four factors, which assess the conduct of both the prose-
cution and the defendant. 291 These factors include: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) 
the prejudice to the defendant. 292 The existence of anyone of the above factors 
is not specifically required to prove a sixth amendment violation. The Court 
emphasized, however, that an individual who fails to assert the right to a speedy 
trial will have difficulty proving that this right was violated. 293 
287 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
288 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972). 
289 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
290 [d. at 529. 
291 [d. 
292 [d. at 530-32. A defendant is considered to have been prejudiced by the delay if it: (I) resulted 
in an unnecessarily oppressive pretrial detention; (2) caused the defendant concern and anxiety; and 
(3) impaired the defendant's defense. Furthermore, the Court observed that the third factor was the 
most important to consider when determining if there has been prejudice to the defendant. !d. at 532. 
293 !d. at 532. The Court expressly rejected the demand-waiver rule which makes a defendant 
automatically lose his right to a speedy trial if he neglects to assert this right. !d. at 528. 
102 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.1 
The Canadian Constitution also has a provIsIOn to protect an individual's 
right to a speedy trial. Section II(b) of the Charter states: 
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right 
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time. 294 
To determine what is an unreasonable time within the context of section II(b), 
Canadian courts have adopted the U.S. balancing approach and the four Barker 
factors. 295 Justification for adopting this U.S. standard has been articulated by 
Justice Allen in Regina v. Biggar.296 He observed that reliance on U.S. court 
cases to interpret the Canadian Constitution can prove to be very helpfui.297 He 
further pointed out that, until the Canadian Supreme Court addresses a par-
ticular issue, lower courts in attempting to decide a case correctly should feel 
free to refer to U.S. jurisprudence.29B Finally, Justice Allen concurred with the 
reasoning used in the Barker case and concluded that it should also be applied 
to section II(b) of the Charter.299 
Although Canadian courts have adopted the U.S. balancing test to determine 
whether an individual's right to a speedy trial has been violated, at least one 
Canadian court has slightly altered the approach.3°O The third factor in the 
Barker test requires the court to determine whether the defendant attempted to 
assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial. 301 In accordance with the Barker 
decision, this factor is to be balanced with the other three factors to determine 
In Barker the court applied the balancing test and held that the defendant had not been denied his 
right to a speedy trial. Id. at 536. Although the delay was too long. minimal prejudice was done to the 
defendant. and the defendant himself did not assert his right to a speedy trial. 
The remedy for violation of this constitutional right is the dismissal of the indictment or vacation 
of the sentence. Strunk v. U.S .• 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
294 Charter § II(b). The Canadian Bill of Rights does not contain a similar provision. 
295 See Regina v. Antoine. 148 D.L.R.3d 149 (1983); Re Coghlin and The Queen, 141 D.L.R.3d 451 
(1982); Re Regina and Thompson, 3 D.L.RAth 642 (1983); Regina v. Donald. 5 D.L.RAth 382 (1983); 
Regina v. Cameron. 70 C.C.C.2d 532 (1982). 
Not all Canadian courts, however, have adopted the Barker test to interpret Section lI(b) of the 
Charter. The court in Re Balderstone and The Queen, 2 C.C.C.3d 37 (1982). applied a different test 
and identified seven factors that should be considered by a court deciding whether a trial delay was 
reasonable. They include: (I) the nature, number and complexity of the charges; (2) the number of 
accused; (3) the volume and complexity of the evidence; (4) the availability of witnesses; (5) the mode 
of trial; (6) the diligence of the Crown and the efforts of the accused; and (7) whether the accused is 
in custody of the charges. Id. at 55. 
296 1 C.C.C.3d 23 (1982). 
297Id. at 26. 
298Id. 
299 Justice Allen stated: 
Indeed I will go so far as to say that much of what was said in the opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court as delivered by Powell j., in the Barker case appeals to my reasoning 
in considering the application of s. II(b) of the Canadian Charter. Id. 
300 Regina v. Antoine. 148 D.L.R.3d 149 (1983). 
301 Barker. 407 U.S. at 531. 
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whether the length of time between arrest and trial has been reasonable.302 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that an individual who failed 
to assert his right to a speedy trial would find it difficult to prove that his sixth 
amendment right was violated.303 The Canadian court in Regina v. Antoine,304 
however, determined that in some instances this third Barker factor should not 
be included in the balancing test. 305 The court noted that, although the failure 
to object to trial delays was an important factor, a delay might be so shocking 
that it violates section ll(b), in spite of the defendant's apparent consent to the 
delay.306 
Section ll(b) has raised important policy considerations.307 In Regina v. Cam-
eron,30B the Canadian court, relying on the Barker decision, listed several reasons 
why society should make sure that an individual receives a trial within a rea-
sonable time. 309 First, an individual who is released on bail awaiting trial for an 
unreasonably long period of time has the opportunity to commit other crimes.31o 
Second, the longer an accused is out on bail awaiting trial, the more likely it 
becomes that he will jump baipll Third, it may be harder to rehabilitate a 
criminal offender if an unreasonable delay occurs between the time of arrest 
and conviction.312 Fourth, an accused is subject to a tremendous amount of 
stress while waiting for the trial to commence.313 Finally, unreasonable trial 
delays, resulting in a backlog of untried cases, make it more likely that a 
defendant's sentence will be reduced through plea bargaining.314 The court in 
Regina v. Cameron stated that these policy considerations would also be used in 
determining whether an individual's right to a speedy trial has been unconsti-
tutionally violated.315 
U.S. jurisprudence has influenced the interpretation of section ll(b) of the 
Charter. Canadian courts have adopted the U.S. balancing approach to help 
determine whether trial delays, within the context of ll(b), are reasonable. 
Furthermore, Canadian courts have adopted the policy considerations articu-
302 [d. at 533. 
303 ld. at 532. 
30' 148 D.L.R.3d 149 (1983). 
30Sld. at 163. 
306ld. The court never defines what length of time is long enough to warrant the label "shocking". 
In the Antoine case the court, however. determined that 26 months was not a long enough time to be 
considered shocking. 
307 Regina v. Cameron, 70 C.C.C.2d 532, 536-37 (1982) (Citing Barker 407 U.S. at 519-20). 
308 70 C.C.C.2d 532 (1982). 






31Sld. at 537. 
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lated by the U.S. Supreme Court, which discuss the reasons why an individual 
should receive a trial within a reasonable time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The British North America Act of 1867, Canada's constitutional document, 
was not designed to protect civil liberties. Although the framers of the BNA 
adopted the U.S. concept of federalism, they did not include any provisions 
similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights. As a result, Canadian courts did not rely on 
U.S. decisions to help protect civil liberties in Canada. 
In 1960, the Canadian government enacted a federal statute entitled the 
Canadian Bill of Rights. Drafters intended this instrument to help protect 
individual rights in Canada. Many sections of the Canadian Bill of Rights were 
similar to provisions contained in the U.S. Bill of Rights. Although the two 
documents were structured similarly, the Canadian courts did not rely on U.S. 
opinions to help protect civil rights in Canada. The rights protected by the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, unlike the rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights, were not 
part of the constitution. The Canadian courts, therefore, were cautious about 
using this federal statute to protect individual rights. In fact, the Canadian court 
system used its Bill of Rights only once to strike down a statute for being 
unconstitutional. 
In 1982, the Canadian Parliament amended its Constitution to include the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This document provides constitutional pro-
tection for the civil rights of Canadian citizens. The language in the document, 
however, is quite general, and the Canadian courts have been left with the task 
of ascertaining the actual status of individual rights under the Charter. Many 
Canadian courts have already written decisions addressing the issue of how the 
Charter should be interpreted. 
Substantively, the U.S. Constitution and the Charter are similar, both pro-
tecting many of the same rights. This Comment examined three sections of the 
Charter which contain language similar to provisions in the U.S. Bill of Rights. 
An examination of court decisions involving sections 2 and II(b) of the Charter 
indicates that the Canadian courts are willing to rely on U.S. jurisprudence to 
help interpret its new constitution. Canadian courts have adopted several U.S. 
tests and standards to determine whether individuals' rights to free expression 
and a speedy trial have been unconstitutionally restricted. Furthermore, the 
Canadian courts have made comparisons between the language protecting free-
dom of expression in both constitutions to help determine exactly what rights 
are protected by section 2 of the Charter. 
Canadian courts, however, have been more reluctant to rely on U.S. jurispru-
dence in the area of search and seizure. Although courts have adopted the U.S. 
balancing test and plain view doctrine to help interpret section 8 of the Charter, 
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they have determined that, unlike the U.S. approach, search and seizure does 
not protect a right of privacy. Furthermore, Canadian courts, citing the dissat-
isfaction in the United States with the exclusionary rule, have narrowly defined 
the scope of the exclusion clause contained in section 24 of the Charter. 
It appears that although Canadian courts are willing to rely on U.S. jurispru-
dence to help interpret its Charter, they will be more reluctant to do so in areas 
where the U.S. Bill of Rights, as interpreted by U.S. courts, has undergone 
criticism. Therefore, if there has been adverse reaction to the U.S. judicial 
approach regarding a civil rights issue, it is likely that the Canadian courts will 
develop a different approach to resolve that same issue within the context of 
the Canadian Charter. As a result, the U.S. influence on the interpretation of 
rights protected by the Charter will be a function of the reaction to the approach 
taken by U.S. courts with respect to those same rights. 
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